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A group of 70 organizations is asking President Obama to build on his
work against bullying in schools by endorsing legislation pending in
Congress that would prohibit harassment of LGBT students.
In a letter dated March 7, the groups ask Obama to endorse the Student
Non-Discrimination Act, or SNDA, which would prohibit and harassment
in public elementary and secondary schools based on a student's actual
or perceived LGBT status. No federal law explicitly prohibits
harassment against LGBT students in school.
"SNDA would provide lesbian, gay, bisexual and transgender ("LGBT")
students with long overdue and much needed explicit federal
protections against discrimination and harassment," the letter states.
"The legislation also protects students who associate with LGBT
people, including students with LGBT parents and friends."
The organizations — led by the American Civil Liberties Union —
include LGBT groups such as the Human Rights Campaign, Lambda Legal
and the Gay, Lesbian & Straight Education Network, or GLSEN, as well
as other groups, such as the American Psychological Association, the
Feminist Majority and the Southern Poverty Law Center. Religious
groups, such as the Episcopal Church, the Methodist Church and the
United Church of Christ also signed the letter.
Obama has said he's committed to combatting bullying and harassment in
schools, but has yet to endorse legislation that would explicitly
prohibit the bullying of LGBT students.
The letter asks Obama to endorse SNDA so that it has the same level of
support from the White House as other pro-LGBT bills, such as the
Respect for Marriage Act, which Obama endorsed in June, or the
Employment Non-Discrimination Act.
"An endorsement of the Student Non-Discrimination Act would likewise
be a clarion call for equality in our schools and better protections
for vulnerable children," the letter states. "And more importantly, it
would make clear to all Members of Congress what the administration
views as a necessary federal legislative solution to the serious
problem of anti-LGBT discrimination and harassment in our nation's
public schools."
Groups send the letter to Obama ahead of March 10, which will mark the
anniversary of the anti-bullying summit held at the White House in
2011. The event was seen as the hallmark effort of Obama's commitment
to combat bullying in schools.
Ian Thompson, the ACLU's legislative representative, said an
announcement in support of SNDA on the anniversary of the
anti-bullying summit would have significant impact.
"An endorsement by the administration on the anniversary of the White
House Conference on Bullying Prevention would be a powerful statement
from the administration that all students are entitled to an education
unhindered by discrimination and harassment," Thompson said.
Other anti-bullying efforts the administration has undertaken include
holding the first-ever federal LGBT youth summit in June and issuing
guidance informing schools they may be violation of federal laws
protecting students from harassment on the basis of gender by allowing
anti-gay bullying. Obama, Vice President Joe Biden and other
administration officials have also appeared in "It Gets Better"
videos.
Just this week, the Departments of Justice and Education, together
with six private plaintiffs and the Anoka-Hennepin School District in
Minnesota, came to an agreement on a consent decree to resolve alleged
bullying and harassment of students who weren't conforming to gender
stereotypes.
Shin Inouye, a White House spokesperson, said Obama supports the goals
of the SNDA, didn't offer full-throated support of the bill.
--
Together, we can change the world, one mind at a time.
Have a great day,
Tommy
--
Together, we can change the world, one mind at a time.
Have a great day,
Tommy
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http://www.glennbeck.com/2012/03/09/turkey-cheese-no-pink-slime-yes/
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http://www.theblaze.com/stories/usda-buys-7-million-pounds-of-pink-slime-for-school-lunches/
School lunch programs have been in the spotlight recently. Just last week, the Blaze posted two stories about a North Carolina school where the food police were aggressively monitoring lunches that parents give to their children. Earlier this year, First Lady Michelle Obama lead a very public campaign to announce that healthier foods would be coming to school cafeterias and military mess halls.
Today, many parents will be questioning the wisdom of a government-controlled school lunch program. Why? Because the Feds have announced that the USDA is buying seven million pounds of something that is affectionately known as "pink slime."
The seven million pounds of this frankenmeat product purchased by the USDA is not a new addition to the lunch programs in schools, just a substantial increase. The New York Times reported that in 2009 the U.S. government purchased 5.5 million pounds of the stuff.
Pink slime is a mixture of leftover trimmings, sinew, and other beef parts culled from a cow once the expensive and more recognizable cuts of meat have been harvested and sent to a butcher. The collection of leftovers is spun in a centrifuge to remove excess fat, washed in a disinfecting solution and then minced for use in various applications.
Pink slime is allowed to make up as much as 15% of the ground beef you might be purchasing at from your local grocery store. And according to some industry experts, the concoction may be in as much as 70% of the ground beef found in America. Gerald Zirnstein, the scientist who first coined the phrase "pink slime" when he worked at the USDA, told ABC news that calling any package that contains it "fresh ground beef" constitutes " economic fraud:"
Celebrity chef Jamie Oliver is not a fan of this stuff. He recently waged a very public campaign against pink slime and managed to convince McDonald's to stop using it in their hamburgers.
Perhaps the decision from Mickey D's was inspired by this segment on Oliver's TV show:
Joining McDonald's in pledging to stop using pink slime is Burger King and Taco Bell.
The cost savings realized by adding the ammonia treated mixture of trimmings to real ground beef amounts to about 3 cents a pound. And there have been reports from schools and prisons where these burgers are served claiming that the meat smells and tastes of ammonia. And yet the USDA is increasing the amount of pink slime purchased for the national school lunch programs.
If the cost savings are minimal and the fast food industry is removing pink slime from its considerable food distribution network, will the government respond in kind?
http://arstechnica.com/business/news/2012/03/how-anonymous-plans-to-use-dns-as-a-weapon.ars
By Sean Gallagher | Published a day agoLast updated about 23 hours ago
After engaging in a recent rash of attacks in retaliation for the takedown of file-sharing site Megaupload, the Anonymous denial of service "cannons" have been firing considerably fewer shells of late.
While Anonymous group members managed to take down Interpol's website on February 28 (largely by using a Web version of their "Low Orbit Ion Cannon" denial of service tool) and have defaced a number of vulnerable sites (including, most recently, sites belonging to Panda Security), threats to take down bigger targets have failed to materialize. What some believed to be the group's boldest plan yet—an effort to bring down the Internet's entire Domain Name System (DNS)—is now being called a "troll" by members of the group.
But this doesn't mean the threat of more targeted denial of service attacks based on DNS attacks have gone away. Disappointed with the current denial of service tools at their disposal, members of Anonymous are working to develop a next-generation attack tool that will, among other options, use DNS itself as a weapon.
The scale and stealthiness of the technique, called DNS amplification, is its main draw for Anonymous. DNS amplification hijacks an integral part of the Internet's global address book, turning a relatively small stream of requests from attacking machines into a torrent of data sent to the target machines, potentially delivering network traffic of tens or hundreds of gigabytes per second without revealing the source of the attack. It does so by using a vulnerability in the DNS service that's been known since at least 2002.
The DNS system is organized hierarchically. At the top of the hierarchy are the "root" nameservers. These contain information on where to find the nameservers responsible for the next level down in the hierarchy, the nameservers for things like ".com" and ".org" and ".uk." In turn, those nameservers contain information about the next level of the hierarchy, so the ".com" nameserver provides information on where to find the "arstechnica" nameserver. The "arstechnica" nameserver is then able to provide the actual mapping from a descriptive name to a numerical IP address.
Doing a DNS lookup requires accessing all these different levels of the hierarchy. There are two ways that a DNS resolver (the piece of software that looks up DNS entries, which can either be a standalone thing on a client machine, or a part of a DNS server) can work: an iterative mode and a recursive mode. In the iterative mode, the resolver first queries the root nameservers for the top-level domain's nameservers, then queries the top-level domain's nameservers for the second level domain's nameservers, and so on and so forth. The resolver contacts the different nameservers directly, one by one, until it has either found the answer it needs or given up because the answer doesn't exist.
In recursive mode, the resolver's job is much simpler: it asks one DNS server for the whole name, then leaves it to the server to perform all the necessary requests (either recursive or iterative) on its behalf.
How DNS recursion is supposed to work, in three easy steps.
Sean Gallagher
There is also extensive caching by all the servers involved; many requests are serviced by using information stores in the cache rather than having to query other servers each time a machine wants to know how to find "google.com," for instance.
Typically, the DNS resolvers built into client operating systems ask nameservers (usually the ones provided by ISPs) to perform recursive queries on their behalf. The lookups then performed by these servers to fulfill the requests are typically iterative.
Here's where the problem arises. The response to a DNS query can be considerably larger than the query itself. In the best (or worst) case, a query of just a few dozen bytes can ask for every name within a domain and receive hundreds or thousands of bytes in response. Every request sent to a DNS server has a source address—an IP address to which the reply should be sent—but these source addresses can be spoofed. That is, a request can be sent from one IP address but the DNS server will think it was sent by a different address.
Using these two things—recursive lookups that return large amounts of data to small queries, and spoofed source addresses—attacks can be made. The attacker first finds a server that is configured to enable recursive lookups. He then sends a large number of requests to the server, spoofing the source address so that the server thinks that the victim machine is making the request. Each of these requests is chosen so that it generates a large response, much larger than the queries themselves. The server will then send these large responses to the victim machine, inundating it with traffic. The disparity between the request size and the response is why these attacks are known as "amplification" attacks.
While consensus is that publicly accessible DNS servers should have recursion disabled, precisely to avoid this kind of problem, the reality is that not all do. Given enough servers that enable recursion, large quantities of traffic can be produced from relatively modest numbers of queries.
A paper (PDF) presented at the 2006 DefCon security conference by Baylor University's Randal Vaughan and Israeli security consultant Gadi Evron documented a series of DNS amplification attacks in late 2005 and early 2006—including one on Internet service provider Sharktech that achieved volumes of packets "as high as 10Gbps and used as many as 140,000 exploited name servers." Depending on the number and network capacity of servers targeted, it's reasonable to assume a coordinated attack by Anonymous could generate several times that volume.
As Vaughan and Evron wrote, "A DNS query consisting of a 60 byte request can be answered with responses of over 4000 bytes, amplifying the response packet by a factor of 60."
In a variant of the attack described by SecureWorks' Don Jackson, the query simply asks the server for a "root hint": the addresses of the name servers for the "." domain, the home of the Internet's root DNS servers. Because there are a large number of root name servers, and because the implementation of DNS-SEC has added certificate data to root server responses, the data returned for each request is about 20 times larger than the query packet.
A comparison of the payloads of a DNS "root hint" query and its response. Not all data shown.
Sean Gallagher
Since it's possible to hide the source of an attack with UDP through forged headers, and because it requires relatively little bandwidth from the attack side, DNS amplification has some obvious benefits to groups like Anonymous. While attackers can't use the Tor anonymizing network (Tor doesn't transfer UDP traffic), they can use various VPNs to add another layer of security.
Aside from the mass of data a DNS amplification attack can create, an attacker gets other benefits from the technique. DNS amplification relies on UDP, a "connectionless" protocol under which packets get sent to a destination without any sort of "handshake" or even a guarantee it will be received. Because there's no sort of negotiation (and because DNS data isn't something usually filtered by application firewalls or other systems), this isn't a simple attack to prevent.
Can anything be done?
